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1Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance:
2How Insurance Companies Act as
3“Compliance Managers” for Businesses
4Shauhin A. TaleshAQ6 5
6While data theft and cyber risk are major threats facing organizations, existing
7research suggests that most organizations do not have sufficient protection to prevent
8data breaches, deal with notification responsibilities, and comply with privacy laws. This
9article explores how insurance companies play a critical, yet unrecognized, role in
10assisting organizations in complying with privacy laws and dealing with cyber theft. My
11analysis draws from and contributes to two literatures on organizational compliance:
12new institutional organizational sociology studies of how organizations respond to legal
13regulation and sociolegal insurance scholars’ research on how institutions govern through
14risk. Through participant observation at conferences, interviews, and content analysis of
15insurer manuals and risk management services, my study highlights how insurers act as
16compliance managers for organizations dealing with cyber security threats. Well beyond
17pooling and transferring risk, insurance companies offer cyber insurance and unique risk
18management services that influence the ways organizations comply with privacy laws.
19
20INTRODUCTION
21This article explores the rise of the insurance industry as a regulatory interme-
22diary of corporate behavior. Whereas recent insurance law and society research has
23examined the role that insurance and insurance companies play in shaping the
24meaning of compliance in corporate governance (Baker and Griffith 2010), employ-
25ment (Talesh 2015a), and policing settings (Rappaport forthcoming), I explore how
26the insurance field, through cyber insurance, responds to and influences the mean-
27ing of compliance among organizations that are dealing with privacy laws and a
28burgeoning global problem: cyber security.
29Cyber risks, that is, loss exposure associated with the use of electronic equip-
30ment, computers, information technology, and virtual reality, are among the biggest
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31new threats facing businesses and consumers. Cyber security risks are crucial as con-
32sumer, financial, and health information are increasingly stored in electronic form.
33Hackers, malware, viruses, tracking software, wiretapping, eavesdropping, robocalls,
34and solicitation lead to identity theft and compromised personal, financial, and
35health information. These breaches affect virtually every major industry, including,
36but not limited to, financial services, health care, government, entertainment,
37online gaming, retail, law, insurance, social networking, and credit card processing.
38As people become more reliant on electronic communication and organiza-
39tions collect and maintain more information about their consumers, the opportunity
40for bad actors to cause problems for organizations and the public is growing expo-
41nentially. The number of data breaches tracked by the Identity Theft Resource
42Center (ITRC) in 2015 was 781, the second highest year on record since the ITRC
43began tracking breaches in 2005 (ITRC 2016). The Ponemon Institute, an indepen-
44dent research organization on privacy, data protection, and information security
45policy, notes that 75 percent of organizations surveyed experienced data loss or
46breach since 2014 (Ponemon Institute 2016). The Office of Civil Rights indicated
47that 112 million health-care-related records were lost, stolen, or inappropriately dis-
48closed via data breaches in 2015 (Munro 2015). According to recent reports, the
49average cost of a data breach event for an organization is between 3 and 7 million
50dollars (Podolak 2015; Lovelace 2016).1
51In addition to financial and public relations damage, data breach events often
52threaten an organization’s survival. Organizations also face compliance hurdles as
53they navigate between various, sometimes overlapping, federal and state laws and
54regulations concerning the collection and use of personal data.2 The proliferation of
55security breaches in the last five years has resulted in an expansion of privacy laws,
56regulations, and industry guidelines. The increased flow of data across state bound-
57aries, coupled with the increased enactment of data-protection-related statutes, cre-
58ates significant challenges for organizations operating at a national level to comply
59with the state and federal legal requirements.
60Even when there is no evidence that compromised data were used or otherwise
61disseminated, companies are still potentially subject to notification requirements,
62resulting in significant costs. Forty-seven states have notification statutes that
63require prompt notice of data breaches to those affected and to the state attorney
64general. Moreover, many statutes impose a significant daily fine for late notice or a
1. In addition, IBM’s most recent report indicated that it costs approximately $158 for every lost or
stolen record. In highly regulated industries such as health care, the cost of a breach can be as much as $355
per record (Lovelace 2016).
2. There is no single, comprehensive federal national law regulating the collection and use of personal
data in the United States. Instead, the United States has a patchwork of federal and state laws that some-
times overlap. The major federal laws that regulate privacy in different ways include, but are not limited to,
the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Financial Services Modernization Act, the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act. There are many laws at the state level that regulate the collection and use of personal data. Some fed-
eral privacy laws preempt state privacy laws on the same topic. For example, the federal law regulating com-
mercial e-mail and the sharing of e-mail addresses preempts most state laws regulating the same activities.
However, there are many federal privacy laws that do not preempt state laws, which means that a company
can find itself in the position of trying to comply with federal and state privacy laws that regulate the same
types of data or types of activity in slightly different ways.
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65private right of action for failure to comply. Finally, as the number of data breaches
66grows, so does the number of individuals pursuing legal action to remedy their
67injuries.3
68Despite legal, reputational, financial, and survival threats, prevailing research
69suggests that private organizations are not significantly changing their behavior.
70Although many organizations do have formal policies in place, the majority of
71organizations do not believe they are sufficiently prepared for a data breach, have
72not devoted adequate money, training, and resources to protect consumers’ elec-
73tronic and paper-based information from data breaches, and fail to perform ade-
74quate risk assessments (Business Wire 2015; Ponemon Institute 2015, 2016). In
75fact, because complying with multiple security frameworks is difficult, time consum-
76ing, and expensive, many organizations express “compliance fatigue” (Armerding
772015).
78Recognizing this underpreparation and undercompliance gap, the insurance
79field stepped in during the last decade and began offering cyber insurance. Cyber
80insurance is insurance designed to provide both first-party loss and third-party lia-
81bility coverage for data breach events, privacy violations, and cyber attacks.
82Although there is variation in the types of policies being offered, insurers offering
83cyber insurance provide some risk shifting for the costs associated with having to
84respond, investigate, defend, and mitigate against the consequences surrounding a
85cyber attack.
86Compared to other lines of insurance, cyber insurance is in its infancy. There-
87fore, there is limited data on how competitive the cyber market is. However, we do
88know the cyber insurance market is growing rapidly as organizations become more
89aware of its potential usefulness. Whereas most companies did not have cyber insur-
90ance a decade ago, one in three organizations now has insurance specifically pro-
91tecting against cyber and data theft losses (Fernandes 2014; Business Wire 2015).4
92The insurance industry’s most recent reports, issued in 2015, indicate that 120
93insurance groups are writing cyber insurance in the United States, totaling approxi-
94mately $1 billion in direct written premiums with a loss ratio of 65 percent (Busi-
95ness Wire 2016).5 Recent estimates suggest that the global insurance market
96collected approximately $2 billion in cyber insurance premiums and that this will
97rise by a magnitude of three to five times by 2020 (Business Wire 2016). Cyber
98insurance, therefore, is one of the biggest areas of growth among insurers, and
99organizations, in turn, are increasingly purchasing cyber insurance to deal with
100these new risks.
3. Different legal theories used by victims of data breach include (1) common law tort and contract
claims, (2) constitutional privacy claims, (3) state and federal statutory claims, and (4) failure to notify
claims under state data breach notification statutes.
4. In 2013, cyber insurance policies sold to retailers, hospitals, banks, and other businesses rose 20 per-
cent according to Marsh LLC, a New York insurance brokerage firm that tracks the market (Fernandes
2014).
5. For insurance, the loss ratio is the ratio of total losses incurred (paid and reserved) in claims plus
adjustment for expenses divided by the total premiums earned. Thus, if the loss ratio is 65.2 percent, it
means that for every $100 million collected in premiums, the insurance companies are paying out approxi-
mately $65 million to policyholders.
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101Despite the increased attention on data theft and cyber insurance, there has
102been little research directed toward the role that insurance and, in particular, insur-
103ance institutions play in constructing the meaning of compliance with privacy laws
104and dealing with data breach. Drawing from participant observation and ethno-
105graphic interviews at cyber insurance conferences across the country, in addition to
106content analysis of cyber insurance policies, loss prevention manuals, cyber insur-
107ance risk management services, and webinars, my data suggest that insurance com-
108panies and institutions, through cyber insurance, go well beyond simply pooling and
109transferring an insured’s risk to an insurance company or providing defense and
110indemnification services to an insured; rather, my data suggest that cyber insurers
111are also acting as compliance managers.
112By offering a series of risk management services developed within the insur-
113ance field, insurance institutions actively shape the way organizations’ various
114departments tasked with dealing with data breach, such as in-house counsel, infor-
115mation technology, compliance, public relations, and other organizational units,
116respond to data breaches. Cyber insurance provides a pathway for insurance institu-
117tions to act as external compliance overseers and managers of organizational behav-
118ior with respect to data theft. Given the underpreparation and compliance by
119businesses, I conclude that institutionalized risk management techniques developed
120within the insurance field can potentially improve organizational practices and
121compliance concerning data breach, but may have some potential drawbacks as
122well.
123RISK-BASED AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TOWARD
124STUDYING ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
125Consistent with the global turn away from command-and-control regulation
126and toward more public-private partnerships and self-regulation, insurance scholars
127are increasingly discussing the role of private insurance as a form of regulation over
128individuals and organizations (Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Talesh 2015b). Insur-
129ance policies often take the form of private legislation or regulation through a wide
130variety of exclusions and conditions. To that end, insurance companies play an
131important role by shaping policy language and also communicating ideas about
132what law means to organizations tasked with complying with and implementing
133various legislative and regulatory mandates. Broadening this frame, Baker and
134Simon explore how institutions address compliance concerns by “governing through
135risk” or “[using] formal considerations about risk to direct organizational strategy
136and resources” (Baker and Simon 2002, 11). This concept includes not only the use
137of risk-based principles by insurance companies, but also the use of insurance tech-
138nologies and concepts to govern risk outside of insurance institutions (Baker and
139Simon 2002; Ewald 2002; Heimer 2002).
140In particular, scholars examining these issues across a variety of contexts note
141that insurance develops templates to regulate behavior in ways that are potentially
142more precise than some forms of governmental control (Ben-Shahar and Logue
1432012). Through policy language, pricing, and risk management services, liability
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144insurance companies actively engage in loss prevention and try to influence the
145behavior of actors and organizations (Heimer 2002; Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 2003;
146Baker 2005; Baker and Griffith 2010; Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Abraham
1472013). Insurers, and insurer risk management techniques, manage moral hazard in
148property and fidelity relationships (Heimer 1985), govern security in the home
149(O’Malley 1991), impact the motion picture industry in the United States (Hubbart
150199621997), influence risk management approaches toward campus drinking
151(Simon 1994), and encourage better policing practices (Rappaport forthcoming).
152Recent work in this area pivots away from how policy language acts as a form
153of regulation to focusing on the processes and mechanisms through which insurers
154engage in risk regulation and the extent to which insurance institutions influence
155or induce compliant behavior with laws and regulations. Here, empirical findings
156are much more mixed; although insurers offering directors and officers insurance
157have an opportunity to influence the behavior of directors and officers and discour-
158age wrongful or even illegal behavior, they seldom do (Baker and Griffith 2010).6
159More recently, insurance scholars have drawn from new institutional organiza-
160tional sociology studies to explain how insurance institutions mediate the meaning
161of compliance through a logic of risk operating within the insurance field. Prior
162new institutional research reveals how managerial conceptions of law anchored
163around concepts of rationality, efficiency, and discretion broaden the term diversity
164in a way that disassociates the term from its original goal of protecting civil rights
165(Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001), transform sexual harassment claims into
166personality conflicts (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993), deflect or discourage
167complaints rather than offering informal resolution (Marshall 2005), and even
168shape the way public legal institutions such as legislatures (Talesh 2009, 2014),
169courts (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Edelman 2005, 2007; Edelman et al.
1702011), and arbitration forums (Talesh 2012) understand law and compliance. Draw-
171ing from new institutional studies, I show how the insurance field frames the legal
172environment of employers around concerns of risk (Talesh 2015a, 2015b).
173For example, through employment practice liability insurance (EPLI), insur-
174ance companies play a critical and as yet unrecognized role in mediating the mean-
175ing of antidiscrimination law (Talesh 2015a,b). Faced with uncertain legal risk
176concerning potential discrimination violations, insurance institutions elevate the
177risk and threat in the legal environment and offer EPLI and a series of risk manage-
178ment services that build discretion into legal rules and mediate the nature of civil
179rights compliance. In this setting, risk and managerial values work in a complemen-
180tary manner because the insurance field uses risk-based logics to encourage employ-
181ers to engage in managerial responses such as developing policies and procedures.7
6. Directors and officers liability insurance (often called “D&O”) is liability insurance payable to the
directors and officers of a company, or to the organization itself, as reimbursement for losses or advancement
of defense costs in the event an insured suffers such a loss as a result of a legal action brought for alleged
wrongful acts in his or her capacity as a director and/or officer.
7. Although there are a few new institutional studies in this area that frame risk in terms of litigation
threat, new institutionalists have yet to engage in a comprehensive exploration of the processes through
which risk narratives influence the meaning of compliance (Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992; Dobbin
et al. 1993; Schneiberg and Soule 2004;AQ5 Edelman 2016).
J_ID: LSI Customer A_ID: LSI12303 Cadmus Art: LSI12303 Ed. Ref. No.: 12303 Date: 21-April-17 Stage: Page: 5
ID: geethapriya.p Time: 12:22 I Path: w:/JW-LSI#170015
Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance 5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2974233
182This study continues in this recent tradition of marrying new institutional
183studies of compliance and sociolegal studies of risk and moves into an area largely
184unexplored by scholars: privacy law and data theft. Prior research in this area
185focuses on the role that privacy officers play in shaping compliance with privacy
186law without focusing on cyber insurance and the role that insurance companies
187play as managers of the compliance behavior of organizations (Bamberger and Mul-
188ligan 2015). My study bridges the new institutional and insurance and risk litera-
189tures. In particular, I import the governing through risk approach into new
190institutional studies of law and organizations by revealing how risk management
191services and risk-based logics that are institutionalized within the insurance field
192influence what organizations are told privacy laws mean and how they are told to
193respond to data breaches.
194METHODOLOGY
195My research design evaluated how, through cyber insurance, participants in
196the insurance field, that is, insurance companies, claims administrators, brokers,
197agents, risk management consultants, underwriters, product managers, in-house
198counsel, and insurance attorneys, respond to data breach issues and influence the
199meaning of compliance with cyber security and privacy laws. A series of subques-
200tions guided my inquiry: (1) How does the insurance industry shape the way that
201organizations respond to data theft breaches and the accompanying privacy laws?
202(2) How does the insurance industry characterize the objectives of privacy laws? (3)
203How does the insurance industry characterize the problem of data theft (cyber secu-
204rity)? and (4) How do formal considerations of risk impact the way that the insur-
205ance field responds to cyber security threats?
206To answer these questions, I gained entry into the emerging field of cyber
207insurance, which is not easily accessible to social science research. I used different
208sources of data from a variety of locations.8 Obtaining data from a variety of sources
209(participant observation, interviews, and content analysis) was particularly impor-
210tant because I was trying to map an aspect of the insurance field, cyber insurance,
211that is largely nascent and in its early stages of development. Because I do not have
212data on how cyber insurance impacts actual organizational behavior, or whether
213cyber insurance and the risk management services that insurers offer lead to less
214data theft, my data focus is on how the insurance field frames compliance with pri-
215vacy laws and how it attempts to prevent data theft from organizations.9
8. Because unfettered access was unrealistic and preliminary inquiries revealed that industry officials
were resistant to formal in-depth interviews, I triangulated through participant observation, ethnographic
interviewing, and extensive content analysis.
9. Despite these limitations, the increasing purchase of cyber insurance by organizations and the
plethora of insurer risk management tools that are emerging and examined by this study and my fieldwork
suggest, at least preliminarily, that organizations are finding insurer-based compliance management some-
what useful.
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216Participant Observation at Cyber Conferences
217I attended four national conferences on cyber insurance over a period of two
218years. Cyber conferences are three days long, occur two to three times a year, and
219bring together various actors engaged in employment practices liability to discuss
220important issues in the field. These conferences have been occurring for approxi-
221mately ten years. Cyber conferences are where the majority of actors involved in
222drafting, marketing, buying, and selling cyber insurance engage one another. Cyber
223conferences allowed me to observe the field and to explore how various organiza-
224tional actors think about data breaches and privacy laws, to document what logics
225or frames were dominating the discourse as participants discussed cyber insurance,
226and to explore how field actors use and market cyber insurance as a mechanism
227through which organizations can better comply with privacy laws.
228Cyber liability insurance conferences were typically held at hotels. Approxi-
229mately fifty to seventy-five insurance field actors attended these conferences. Panel
230sessions occurred daily and brought attendees together in one conference room.10 I
231observed approximately thirty-one panel sessions on cyber insurance. Conference
232rooms were set up much like classrooms, with a podium and table for discussants in
233the front of the room and rows of tables and chairs for audience members.
234Webinars
235I also observed, transcribed, and coded cyber insurance webinars administered
236by risk management consultants and brokers, insurance industry and cyber security
237experts, and attorneys. These webinars simultaneously market cyber insurance and
238educate webinar participants on what cyber insurance is, educate participants on
239how cyber insurance is used, and highlight the various risk management services
240that are provided to organizations that purchase cyber insurance. Similar to confer-
241ences, cyber insurance webinars allowed me to explore how various organizational
242actors discuss the interplay between insurance, data theft, and privacy laws.
243Content Analysis from Primary Sources: Cyber Insurance Policies and Risk
244Management Services
245Unlike most lines of insurance, insurance companies offering cyber liability
246insurance also offer accompanying risk management services to address a wide vari-
247ety of problems that organizations experience when data breaches occur. Cyber
248insurers rely heavily on offering organizations either the risk management services
249they have or the services of third-party vendors with whom they contract. I
250reviewed over thirty different risk management services offered by insurers and
251third-party vendors. These data proved to be a key area of focus for this research
252project. Researching the risk management services was important because it
10. There was never more than one panel session going on at a time.
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253revealed how the insurance industry acts as a compliance manager well beyond the
254traditional services that the insurance industry offers. I also reviewed industry
255reports and executive summaries by risk management consultants who conduct
256research on the kinds of cyber liability insurance coverage offered by insurers. In
257addition to these reports, I also obtained and evaluated cyber insurance policies.
258While most EPLI policies have similar provisions, some vary with respect to the
259type of specific first- and third-party coverage offered.
260Ethnographic Interviews
261My observations at the annual cyber conferences allowed me to identify vari-
262ous field actors and to pursue informal, ethnographic interviews. Ethnographic
263interviewing is a type of qualitative research that combines immersive observation
264and directed, one-on-one interviews (Spradley 1979). Because these interviews
265occur in the interviewees’ natural settings while they are performing their normal
266tasks, the interviews are less formal. While at the conferences, I conducted twenty-
267two ethnographic interviews with field actors. These interviews varied in length
268from five to thirty minutes and generally involved eliciting opinions about the
269interplay between cyber insurance and various privacy laws from (1) insurance
270agents, (2) brokers, (3) claims administrators, (4) insurance company executives,
271and (5) attorneys.
272Coding
273Following standard procedures and protocols for qualitative research, data
274analysis proceeded from coding, to developing conceptual categories based on the
275codes, to defining the conceptual categories, and, finall,y to clarifying the links
276between the conceptual categories (Fielding 1993; Charmaz 2001; Lofland et al.
2772005). I first open coded (Lofland et al. 2005). Under this coding approach, writ-
278ten data from field notes and insurance industry documents were coded line by
279line (Charmaz 2001). I initially created some preliminary substantive coding cate-
280gories around actors encountered in the field, activities observed in the field, and
281variation in written cyber security materials produced by insurance actors. Focused
282coding (Charmaz 2001) led me to refine my coding into analytic categories and
283to identify how risk-based principles and values filter the way that insurance
284actors discuss compliance with privacy laws. To add a layer of formality, transpar-
285ency, and systematization to my coding process, I used qualitative coding software
286(ATLAS.ti) to code my written materials, interviews, and field notes (Fielding
2871993).
288While no one method used in this study provides enough data to reveal con-
289clusive findings, I am confident that triangulating across multiple sites and examin-
290ing different data points led to reliable findings. Unlike prior studies of insurance as
291regulation and insurer risk management, I am studying a field that is largely imma-
292ture and changing in real time. Insurance scholars, therefore, would benefit from
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293replicating this study in another ten years to see to what degree insurer risk man-
294agement in this area has evolved and to what degree such techniques are impacting
295organizational responses to data breaches and privacy law more generally.
296INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS AS COMPLIANCE MANAGERS OF
297DATA THEFT BREACHES AND PRIVACY LAWS
298The following explores how insurance companies and institutions, through
299cyber liability insurance, actively shape the way an organization’s various depart-
300ments tasked with dealing with data breach, such as in-house counsel, informa-
301tion technology, compliance, public relations, and other organizational units,
302respond to data breach. I find that cyber insurers are acting as compliance man-
303agers aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to data breaches and com-
304plying with various privacy laws. Through policy language and risk management
305services, insurance companies and the third-party vendors with whom they con-
306tract to assist insureds absorb the responsibilities of the legal counsel, compliance,
307public relations, and information technology departments for organizations with a
308series of additional risk management services. FigureF1 1 highlights how insurance
309companies shape the nature of compliance through expansive policy coverage
310and risk management services. In addition to policy language, the insurance field
311uses a series of mechanisms aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to
312data theft.
313Cyber Insurance—Beyond Risk Transfer of Defense and Expenses
314Analysis of various cyber insurance policies reveals that this insurance is an
315important intervention in the insurance market because it expands coverage to
316insureds for losses specifically excluded by other lines of insurance. When
317data breach issues arose about a decade ago, policyholders fought, largely
FIGURE 1.
How the Insurance Field Influences the Meaning of Compliance with Privacy
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318unsuccessfully, with commercial general liability (CGL) and property insurers over
319coverage.11 Modern CGL policies specifically exclude electronic data from the defi-
320nition of property damage, which means that the only form of coverage that CGL
321policies can provide is associated with liability from physical damage to hardware,
322which is unusual in most cyber incidents. Property insurance and other lines of
323insurance also exclude coverage for losses associated with data breach.
324Cyber insurance eliminates potential denials of coverage that often occur under
325other lines of insurance and provides a source of risk transfer. Cyber insurance is simi-
326lar to homeowner and automobile insurance and some other lines of insurance
327because it covers a very broad scope of losses. In particular, cyber insurance policies
328provide both first-party coverage (the policyholder insures her own interest in her
329body or property) and third-party coverage (which pays proceeds to a third party to
330whom an insured becomes liable) for data breach events. Thus, cyber insurance often
331covers the loss of personal information regardless of how the data were lost or stolen.
332Although the scope and breadth of coverage varies among insurers, this insurance
333tries to shift risks for the costs associated with having to respond, investigate, defend,
334and mitigate against the consequences surrounding a cyber attack.
335Cyber insurance covers the liability that flows from the loss, such as lawsuits filed
336by individual victims or from business partners that experience harm as a result of the
337data breach. In other words, cyber liability insurance protects the insured from actual
338or potential liability and litigation defense expenses to a third party as the result of a
339cyber event, such as damages arising from the theft of personal identification informa-
340tion, identity theft, third-party network interruption, third-party security failures, and
341cyber extortion. Cyber liability insurance also covers the insured’s own costs to notify
342and monitor the credit of the victims, perform a forensic investigation, and handle the
343public relations campaign to maintain and restore the public’s trust in the organization.
344FigureF2 2 highlights the broad coverage provided in most cyber insurance policies.
345Although cyber insurance provides defense and indemnification for a broader
346scope of coverage, cyber insurance is not all-encompassing. Because the cyber insur-
347ance market is so new, brokers and underwriters struggle with evaluating how to price
348and evaluate the risk of loss.12 As a result, some insurers offering cyber insurance limit
349their coverage to under $20 million and often insist on sizeable deductibles. Moreover,
350cyber insurance does not cover all harms associated with cyber attacks, such as pay-
351ments of ransom to unlock malware, the direct costs to reputation, and the direct costs
352of data destruction. Nonetheless, my fieldwork reveals that organizations view cyber
353insurance policies favorably because far more coverage is provided now than previously
354existed when insureds were forced to try to claim coverage under other lines of insur-
355ance. As the next section shows, the expansive coverage creates space for insurers to
356offer their risk management services to combat the various risks that they insure.
11. A CGL insurance policy is often issued by business organizations to protect them against liability
claims for bodily injury and property damage arising out of premises, operations, products, and completed
operations. Property insurance provides protection against most risks to property, such as fire, theft, and
some weather damage. This includes specialized forms of insurance such as fire insurance, flood insurance,
earthquake insurance, home insurance, or boiler insurance.
12. Specifically, underwriters that I spoke with indicated that they do not have enough data to make
educated determinations on payout estimates.
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FIGURE 2.
Liability and Defense Expenses Covered Under Cyber Insurance
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357Risk Management Services: Mechanisms Through Which Insurers Seek to
358Influence the Form of Compliance
359My research in the field reveals that insurance institutions are doing something
360more than transferring risk—they are actively managing the underlying risk of data
361breach. The lack of organizational preparation for and response to data breaches and the
362overall undercompliance with privacy laws is a gap being filled by the insurance field and
363the various value-added services that cyber policies offer. Unlike in the directors and offi-
364cers liability insurance context (Baker and Griffith 2010), where insurers had an opportu-
365nity to engage in loss prevention but failed to do so, cyber insurers actively engage in loss
366prevention and fill the roles previously held by internal departments within an organiza-
367tion such as legal, compliance, information technology, and crisis management.
368Insurance industry officials repeatedly refer to themselves as in a partnership
369with their policyholders and indicate that the strength of cyber insurance is the
370assortment of risk management services to which the insured gains access:
371Buyers of cyber insurance are purchasing accessibility to vendors that the
372insurance company has. It is a partnership as we connect to the relation-
373ship of the insurance company. We are not just buying [insurance] cover-
374age. (Conference panel, insurance consumer, lines 56–59)
375We’ve partnered with vendors to bring expertise to our insureds and make sure
376that they have the most current tools available to help keep them ahead of
377the curve. (CyberEdge Strategic Partnership Series, introduction, lines 16–18)
378We offer a proposition, a package [of services] that the insured gains
379access to. (Interview, insurance agent, line 87)
380We see this as a mutually beneficial relationship. The insurance company
381gets the business and the insured becomes a better risk. (Interview, insur-
382ance company official, lines 78–80)
383
384Twenty-two of the thirty-one panels I observed at cyber insurance conferences men-
385tioned or discussed the value of the various risk management services that accompany
386the cyber insurance policy. Thus, cyber insurance—through the risk management serv-
387ices that come with the insurance—provides a pathway for insurance institutions to
388gain influence over organizational decision making relating to compliance issues sur-
389rounding data breach and privacy. As one insurance industry official noted: “We act
390like a quarterback of the data breach response and try to steer the response in the
391right direction” (Insurance official, Panel 8, lines 125–26). The following highlights in
392more detail the mechanisms through which the insurance field attempts to shape and
393influence how organizations deal with data loss and the accompanying privacy laws.
394Insurer Risk Management Services Focus on Preventing and Detecting Data
395Breaches and Influencing the Form of Compliance
396Unlike in the directors and officers professional liability context (Baker and
397Griffith 2010), cyber insurers engage in considerable risk and loss prevention.
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398Insurance companies either have in-house departments or contract with third-party
399organizations that offer a series of services aimed at preventing data breaches and
400violations of privacy laws from ever occurring. In doing so, insurers absorb many of
401the functions of the organizations in terms of preventing these risks.
402Risk prevention begins with a series of assessments, or what one insurer calls
403“cyber health checks.” The goal of these checks is to “give organizations a 360
404degree view of their people, processes and technology, so they can reaffirm that rea-
405sonable practices are in place, harden their data security, qualify for network liabil-
406ity and privacy insurance, and bolster their defense posture in the event of class
407action lawsuits” (NetDiligence 2015). Another risk management assessment tool
408focuses on cyber security best practice standards for categories such as (1) current
409events, (2) security policy, (3) security organization, (4) asset classification and con-
410trol, (5) personnel security, (6) physical and environmental security, (7) computer
411and network management, (8) system development and maintenance, (9) business
412continuity planning, (10) security compliance, (11) Internet liability, and (12) pri-
413vacy and regulatory compliance (NetDiligence 2015). This particular intervention
414assesses data security strengths and weaknesses, and includes a data security score
415for each practice area. The goal is to measure the organization’s practices and make
416sure they are consistent with the prevailing security standards. The health check is
417often followed by an independent, objective review of the organization’s security
418and privacy practices.
419Another insurer offers a risk prevention service called scanning, which analyzes
420the risks that an organization’s security poses: “Scanning . . . detects and prioritizes
421hidden risks on public-facing infrastructures, provides a detailed view of a com-
422pany’s vulnerability status, priority vulnerabilities, and more” (AIG, CyberEdge
423Strategic Partnership Series, IBM security, lines 6–9). Typically, the insurer or the
424affiliated third-party vendor performs a remotely delivered scan of the organization’s
425perimeter network devices such as the firewall, web server, and e-mail servers to
426mitigate vulnerabilities and stave off potential attacks. They also test the effective-
427ness of existing firewalls and web servers. Insurers framed these services as unique
428and value added, well beyond what many existing organizations had in terms of
429detecting cyber security breaches.
430These risk prevention tools and security ratings play an important regulatory
431role over organizations. First, the scans and health checks are sometimes used as a
432precondition for determining whether a potential company is eligible for cyber
433insurance. Organizations interested in insurance protection, therefore, are often
434interested in becoming more cyber secure. Second, the better a company scores on
435its health check, the greater the likelihood the insurance company will lower its
436premiums.13
437Coupled with risk prevention strategies, the insurance field also offers a series
438of services aimed at detecting data breaches before they are completed. These
13. To be fair, the market for cyber insurance is not mature enough to have the refined premium set-
ting standards that exist with more established lines of insurance. Insurers, brokers, and underwriters simply
do not have enough claims history. That said, brokers I spoke with indicated that the more cyber secure
organizations are with good preventative tools in place, the more likely organizations would be issued insur-
ance and receive a favorable pricing arrangement.
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439services include managing and tuning intrusion detection system technologies, man-
440aging host and network-based firewall technologies, managing security information
441and event management correlation technologies, and managing security service pro-
442viders. Insurers often use third-party vendors that offer “shunning” services. This
443service uses intel and security technology to isolate and shun communications to
444and from IP addresses currently being used by criminals. The entire cyber security
445community that I studied repeatedly described these services as invaluable.
446The insurance field also helps extend its preventative approach toward subcon-
447tractors and outside vendors with whom organizations contract to perform services.
448Here, the insurance field positions itself as an intermediary between formal privacy
449law and the need for organizations to interpret, implement, and comply with pri-
450vacy laws properly. Panelists reminded attendees that an organization is potentially
451legally liable for its subcontractor’s or vendor’s data loss. Thus, organizations are
452increasingly trying to contract with vendors who are cyber secure. To ameliorate
453this legal risk, insurers offer services that help measure and monitor the networks of
454vendors with which an organization works. Insurers provide reports of the security
455practices of vendors and allow an organization to compare the practices of other
456vendors when the organization is considering using new or different vendors. Thus,
457insurers’ services allow organizations to have continuous visibility into their ven-
458dors’ security practices to ensure company data are safe, even when they are outside
459the organization’s network.
460Panelists at conferences suggest that the goal of the health check assessments
461is to evaluate the people, processes, and technology and to ensure that organizations
462have a foundation upon which to develop a stronger cyber risk management pro-
463gram. In doing so, the insurance company absorbs many of the functions of the
464information technology department and actively engages in loss prevention. In this
465vein, cyber insurers are similar to insurers offering EPLI (Talesh 2015),AQ1 but different
466than directors and officers insurance (Baker and Griffith 2010). Whereas directors
467and officers have an incentive to have defense and indemnification liability cover-
468age, they are less eager to have outside actors and institutions (such as insurers)
469interfering with their day-to-day decision making and at times risky behavior. How-
470ever, with cyber insurance, the incentives are better aligned. Given the financial,
471legal, and reputational harm, no organization benefits from a cyber attack. Thus,
472policyholders purchasing cyber insurance are interested in using these risk manage-
473ment tools to prevent and detect risks.
474Insurer Risk Management Services Influence the Form of Compliance
475Through Written Training Materials and Telephone Hotlines
476In addition to risk assessments and audits, insurers construct what compliance
477with privacy laws means through a series of written, value-added services. These
478documents also advise organizations on how to prevent and detect data breaches.
479Cyber insurers offer organizations hundreds of forms and documents, including
480access to cyber news and blogs, best practice checklists, monthly newsletters,
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481articles, whitepapers, videos, webinars, and legal summaries, including some that
482address new and amended privacy laws.
483Like trainings conducted by employers (Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999), cyber insurer
484loss prevention manuals and training sessions specifically guide organizations on
485how to avoid regulatory fines and liability for data breach. Creating and maintain-
486ing an incident response plan and team—many members of which are third-party
487vendors in contractual relationships with insurers—is reiterated repeatedly at con-
488ferences and in written materials provided to organizations. Cyber insurers also
489audit an organization’s written policies, procedures, forms, and handbooks to deter-
490mine whether they comply with federal, state, and local laws. These audits focus on
491interpreting and implementing privacy laws and preventing breaches and the result-
492ing fines that are triggered by failing to comply with laws. In addition to these serv-
493ices, insureds have access to a Web site filled with tools and training to identify
494exposure to loss, develop and implement policies and procedures, train staff, and
495stay informed as the compliance issues continue to evolve. Like EPLI, cyber insur-
496ance tries to shape the nature of compliance (Talesh 2015a).
497These written, value-added services can have potential positive and negative
498impacts on compliance. On the one hand, offering these services may reflect some
499best practices, prevent data theft breaches, and lead to improved compliance. More
500specifically, unlike in the EPLI context (Talesh 2015a), insurance company guid-
501ance on these issues does not largely focus on how to avoid litigation—but on how
502to prevent data theft losses in the first instance. On the other hand, these services
503make it easy for organizations to develop policies and procedures without actively
504drafting them.
505Insurers also offer incident response hotlines aimed at identifying and prevent-
506ing risk. These hotlines are made up of subject matter experts who know the latest
507vulnerabilities and the cyber risk landscape and are able to provide specialized
508knowledge to clients to ensure that their cyber infrastructure is secure. Whereas
509EPLI insurers offer a legal hotline that administers legal advice to employers that
510call (Talesh 2015a), cyber insurer hotlines focus on heightening the security systems
511of companies and preventing any data loss. As one insurer notes, the hotline is
512“where subject matter experts may be reached instantly to discuss potential indica-
513tors of compromise to determine if, and how, a compromise may have occurred,
514with advice on what immediate steps to take to address vulnerabilities and con-
515tagion” (AIG, CyberEdge Strategic Partnership Series, IBM security, lines 10–18).
516Cyber insurer risk management services, unlike EPLI insurer risk management serv-
517ices, are more focused on helping organizations avoid data breach and comply with
518privacy laws than mediating the meaning of law. Insurers are stepping into this vac-
519uous space and trying to provide compliance guidance to organizations that have
520security systems unprepared for the latest cyber threats.
521Thus, with respect to the cyber insurer’s risk management services, risk and
522managerial logics complement one another. The insurance field adopts a manageri-
523alized conception of privacy law, which highlights the elaboration of organizations’
524formal structures that demonstrate compliance and rational governance. The insur-
525ance industry sells this vision by highlighting the risk of not developing policies
526and procedures as well as providing a safety net for organizations that includes a
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527series of risk management services in addition to defense and indemnification insur-
528ance coverage.
529Cyber Insurance Provides a Pathway for Insurers to Manage the Legal
530Process, Forensic Investigation, and Credit Monitoring When a Data Breach
531Occurs
532Perhaps the biggest intervention the insurance field makes is the array of risk
533management services it offers to shape the way that organizations respond in the
534event of an actual data breach. Traditionally, insurance covers legal defense and
535indemnification costs associated with a covered loss. In the cyber insurance context,
536insurers cover the legal, forensic, restoration, business interruption, crisis manage-
537ment, and credit monitoring expenses. I was surprised to learn, however, that cyber
538insurance goes beyond risk transfer in the defense and indemnification context
539because it also provides access to services aimed at responding to, investigating,
540defending, and mitigating against the consequences surrounding a data breach event
541or privacy law violation. Cyber insurers provide these risk management services,
542which organizations use to respond to data loss. Insurers either have departmental
543units that deal with various cyber-related problems or contract with third-party ven-
544dors that the insured can use. Typically, the insured receives a reduced premium to
545use the insurer’s vendors. In this respect, cyber insurance provides not only risk
546transfer, but also risk response well beyond the scope of what insurers typically
547handle.
548Typically, organizations facing a cyber violation have incident response teams
549that try to manage and coordinate the data security event investigation, response,
550reporting, and the corrective action taken. Panelists repeatedly describe the numer-
551ous voices that are part of the process:
552The incident response team is made up of the incident response team
553leader, the privacy officer, legal and risk management services department,
554information security, human resources, employee relations, patient rela-
555tions, outside legal counsel who is often the breach coach, crisis manage-
556ment and public relations person, the forensics person and the insurance
557company or broker. The external team members such as outside vendors,
558privacy breach coach, forensics and outside counsel are part of the inter-
559nal response. (Insurance official, Panel 21, lines 123–29)
560
561My research reveals that the insurance company, through the risk management
562services it offers with cyber insurance, largely drives the company’s incident
563response when a data loss occurs. Many of the members of the incident response
564team have direct relationships with the insurance company.
565In particular, many organizations purchasing this insurance express how effi-
566cient it is to have one-stop shopping in the event of a data breach (cf. Talesh
5672015a). Through this close partnership with the insured, insurers gain influence
568over the organization’s compliance process. In particular, the insurance company
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569offers a menu of services that an organization can quickly access in the event of a
570data breach. According to private organizations, the most helpful aspects of cyber
571insurance are the risk management services:
572These services can actually be quite robust and innovative. Finally, insureds
573are able to tap into a built-in network of IT experts, PR firms and legal
574counsel experienced in cyber matters, which brings an enormous amount of
575value to the coverage. (Andrews interview, ABA, April 1, 2015)
576We use the insurance company as a resource for our decision making.
577(Insured, Panel 6, line 10)
578
579Insurers offer insured organizations access to a designated panel of lawyers and
580law firms that can assist in managing the legal issues that arise when a data loss
581incident occurs. These law firms help organizations to prepare for and respond to
582data security incidents. In addition to defending lawsuits, lawyers are particularly
583important because they assist with complying with various privacy laws and regula-
584tory provisions largely geared toward making sure consumers are notified in a timely
585manner that there is a data breach. Because of the variation in consumer notifica-
586tion laws in forty-seven states, lawyers assist policyholders in evaluating which state
587laws have been triggered and what steps the insured must take following a data
588breach event.
589Lawyers are clearly viewed as leaders for data breach response. Panelists repeat-
590edly refer to the lawyer who is retained as the “breach coach.” In particular, policy-
591holders participating on panels indicate that they like being able to contact a
592lawyer who has been vetted by the insurer: “Cyber insurance is a great product
593because of the pre and post breach services. My first [phone] call is to the breach
594coach” (Insured, Panel 6, line 112). They also like that communications thereafter
595concerning the breach are privileged. Typically, panelists noted that the breach
596coach plays a critical and primary role in developing and managing the incident
597response team that is formed when a data breach occurs. Moreover, these lawyers
598provide twenty-four-hour access to the organization’s incident response lawyers
599through an 800 number. While I am not suggesting that in-house counsel does not
600play any role, it appears that the insurance-sponsored law firm retained by an orga-
601nization plays a greater role in many instances. These lawyers and law firms are
602relied on in part because they are repeat players and have developed significant
603experience handling clients experiencing data loss.
604When a company’s cyber security system is breached, an immediate concern is
605identifying the source and cause of the data breach, containing the breach, and ulti-
606mately restoring network processes that may have been damaged as a result of the
607breach. Addressing these problems often requires an information security cyber
608expert. Cyber insurers or their third-party vendors offer forensic experts to organiza-
609tions. My fieldwork reveals almost unanimous support for the insurer’s ability to
610provide rapid access to these forensic services: “A key post-breach service includes
611mitigating harm and having a forensic investigator help the firm” (Hudson 2015).
612One forensic investigator I interviewed highlights how insurers provide access to
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613key forensic services: “Firms really want us to come in and clean things up when a
614breach occurs and our relationship with the insurer makes it easier for the firm to
615access our services” (Forensic investigator interview, lines 43–45). Cyber insurers
616not only provide the insured access to these vendors, but they also cover the costs
617to investigate the cause of the data breach, restore the network processes to normal,
618and retain information security forensics experts. Similar to the legal expertise com-
619ing from the insurance company, insurance companies are also the primary source
620for forensic expertise.
621As noted earlier, another big threat organizations face when a breach occurs is
622damage to its reputation. A study conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit in
6232013 found that more than one-third of customers of companies that suffer a data
624breach refuse to continue doing business with that company in the future (Beazley
6252016). Cyber insurance addresses this risk by covering the costs to retain the serv-
626ices of a public relations and crisis management firm. However, cyber insurers go
627beyond providing coverage by offering a series of preapproved public relations and
628crisis management firms that the insured can retain at a reduced premium. These
629crisis management and public relations firms play a crucial role in developing and
630providing advertising or related communications to protect and restore the insured’s
631reputation following a data breach event. The experience of the public relations
632vendor the insurer is able to provide under tense circumstances was repeatedly
633touted as value-added at conferences: “When a breach occurs, an organization needs
634to respond really quickly. Look at Target. So much damage to their reputation. The
635public relations people know how to manage and finesse those situations” (Insur-
636ance industry official interview, lines 110–13).
637Finally, the other major response organizations often face when a data breach
638violation occurs is dealing with consumers whose financial information is stolen. In
639such situations, millions of people are at risk of credit card and identity theft by
640hackers. Financial institutions, retail stores, and credit card companies that experi-
641ence breaches of consumer information often have to set up credit monitoring and
642restoration services for consumers. This typically includes establishing a call center
643for consumers to respond to customer concerns and inquiries concerning the data
644breach event. Cyber insurance provides access to companies experienced in credit
645monitoring and restoration that organizations can use for a reduced fee. Cyber
646insurance also covers the costs of credit and fraud monitoring and costs associated
647with setting up call centers to respond to customer concerns and inquiries as a
648result of data loss.
649In sum, in an environment in which organizations are undercomplying with
650privacy laws and underprepared for potential data breach events, cyber insurers
651have stepped in as intermediaries and are acting as compliance managers. Cyber
652insurers are doing much more than pooling and spreading risk. Cyber insurers
653heavily influence organizations’ data breach and privacy law response teams. In
654addition to providing defense and indemnification for losses resulting from data
655breaches, insurers are involved in the legal, forensic, information technology, credit
656monitoring, and public relations decisions relating to a data breach event. Insurers
657either offer the insured their risk management services or access to their networks
658of third-party vendors that specialize in dealing with these issues. By offering a
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659series of risk management services developed within the insurance field that are
660aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber security breaches, insurance
661institutions actively shape the way organizations respond to data theft.
662CONCLUSION
663This study elaborates the literature on the relationship between organizations
664and law by blending new institutional organizational sociology studies of how
665organizations respond to legal regulation and sociolegal insurance scholars’ studies
666of how institutions govern through risk. In particular, my study bridges these two
667theoretical frameworks by revealing how in the context of cyber insurance, insurers
668go well beyond pooling and spreading risk and act as compliance managers for
669organizations dealing with cyber security threats. Although prior new institutional
670studies of law and organizations emphasize the way that managerial values influence
671the nature of law and compliance among organizations, governing through risk
672provides an alternative framework by showing how risk management services and
673risk-based logics that are institutionalized by the insurance field influence what
674organizations are told privacy laws mean and how they are told to respond to data
675breach. Consistent with prior studies that blend governing through risk and the
676managerialization of law, concerns over risk and the need for adequate policies and
677procedures drive the process at every stage. Thus, risk and managerialized values
678work in tandem.
679My multisite, multimethod approach also enhances prior studies of insurance
680as regulation by revealing how the insurance field governs through risk and uses
681considerations of risk and insurance services to influence organizational strategy and
682decision making. Whereas early work celebrates insurance as regulation and focuses
683on the forms and functions of insurance, more recent studies of directors and offi-
684cers, employment practices liability, and cyber insurance focus on the conditions
685under which insurance shapes regulatory behavior in positive and negative ways.
686Given the range of findings from these studies, scholars need to think of the
687benefits of insurance as regulation on a continuum. Insurance as regulation does
688not always work, nor does it always fail. Although more research is clearly needed,
689it appears there are a couple of distinctions between EPLI, directors and officers
690insurance, and cyber insurance. For example, prior work in the directors and officers
691context shows how the insurance industry has the ability to engage in loss preven-
692tion behavior but does not try to engage in such behavior (Baker and Griffith
6932010). In the cyber context, the insurance industry does try to engage in loss pre-
694vention and does so in a manner that is focused on managing and averting the risks
695associated with data breach. One likely difference is that in the directors and
696officers context, directors and officers are less eager to be told how to engage in
697risk-averse behavior. Policyholders in the cyber context, however, are interested in
698the insurance defense and indemnity coverage, but also the accompanying risk
699management services that can prevent, detect, and respond to a data breach event.
700The risk management services that accompany cyber insurance also fill a compe-
701tency or knowledge gap for the organization. Organizations are willing to use risk
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702management tools that deal with the latest cyber threats that they lack internal
703tools to defend against. Conversely, directors and officers believe they possess the
704requisite knowledge and experience to manage a corporation responsibly and are
705less eager to receive insurance risk management recommendations.
706Moreover, whereas prior research shows that EPLI insurers spend considerable
707time trying to shape the meaning of law for employers tasked with dealing with dis-
708crimination laws (Talesh 2015a), here, cyber insurers spend far less time mediating
709law’s meaning and far more time trying to enhance an organization’s ability to
710detect and respond when faced with a data breach. Thus, unlike in the EPLI con-
711text, the insurance risk management tools are less about simply avoiding being sued
712and more about developing processes to prevent or limit any data breach problem
713from occurring. Therefore, the conditions under which insurance as regulation
714works depends on a variety of factors. Taken collectively, however, research on
715directors and officers insurance, EPLI, and the cyber liability insurance context
716reflect a significant shift in the manner in which insurers actively shape the nature
717of compliance.
718From a policy standpoint, this study raises important questions about the role
719of insurance in regulating cyber security theft. Although prior research highlights
720how insurance acts as a form of social control on society (Baker and Simon 2002;
721Baker and Griffith 2010; Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012; Abraham 2013), important
722questions remain concerning whether insurers should regulate organizational behav-
723ior and if they do regulate behavior, how that authority is exercised. Similar to
724human resource officials, in-house counsel, and managers (Edelman, Erlanger, and
725Lande 1993; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001), my data suggest that the insur-
726ance field’s involvement as an intermediary may be mix of benefits and
727disadvantages.
728On the one hand, to the extent organizations remain underprepared for cyber
729risks and undercompliant with privacy laws, insurance industry intervention in this
730area is very valuable. The risk management tools offered encourage and, to some
731extent, force stronger detection and security protocols in organizations and nudge
732organizations toward greater safety and security. In turn, this makes consumer infor-
733mation less likely to fall into the hands of wrongdoers. Cyber insurance and risk
734management services such as the audits, hotlines, and online portals of handbook
735materials provide substantive guidance on privacy law and on organizations’ respon-
736sibilities. To the extent that the information provided to organizations is accurate
737in these settings, these services could be compatible with compliance and could
738even induce greater compliance. Moreover, the postbreach services allow organiza-
739tions to turn to one place and address all their concerns. Unlike other financial
740institutions that also offer risk management services related to data breach, insur-
741ance companies are able to package these services with insurance litigation defense
742and indemnification in the event of an actual breach.
743On the other hand, overreliance on cyber risk management systems may allow
744organizations to avoid more active engagement with the design, content, enforce-
745ment, and maintenance of their policies. By encouraging organizations to use
746insurer-sponsored forensics, information technology, public relations units, and hot-
747lines, the insurance field shifts or decouples responsibility for hard normative
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748judgments to others (such as insurance companies) operating outside the organiza-
749tion (cf. Bisom-Rapp 1996, 1999; Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita 2001). Insurance
750companies have an obvious financial incentive in seeing more customers purchase
751cyber insurance and the accompanying risk management services. Insurance indus-
752try services that diminish an organization’s individual responsibility to design its
753cyber security policies and procedures may diminish organizational responsibility for
754making moral, ethical, and legal choices involved with compliance (cf. Baker and
755Simon 2002). To the extent organizations can simply delegate their data breach
756events to the insurers and accompanying risk management vendors, cyber insurers
757may enhance the possibility that organizations are lethargic in taking ownership of
758compliance policies and procedures and, consequently, preventing privacy laws from
759making a greater impact.
760Obviously, future research on whether cyber insurance leads to less data theft
761would help to gauge the value of these insurer-sponsored risk management services.
762Assuming insurer risk management services reduce the likelihood that data breach
763events will occur, my data suggest, at least preliminarily, that there is a net benefit.
764Existing research suggests that organizations are currently unable to keep up with
765cyber threats. Thus, despite insurers’ financial incentives, insurer-sponsored help is
766greatly appreciated by organizations and the consumers whose information is poten-
767tially exposed.
768At a minimum, this study highlights the processes and mechanisms through
769which insurers act as private risk regulators (Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012). Regula-
770tion over privacy and cyber security issues in the United States remains fragmented
771and incomplete. The insurance industry is stepping in and trying to offer organiza-
772tions a pathway for dealing with cyber threats and the abundance of privacy laws.
773Law is typically thought of as top down, coming from public legal institutions such
774as courts, legislators, and regulatory institutions. However, consistent with new legal
775realist and the law and society studies, how organizations implement laws and com-
776ply with various rules is shaped by intermediary institutions such as insurance
777companies.
778Cyber risk management services do not just reduce risk; they actively construct
779the meaning of compliance. As shown in the employment and consumer protection
780contexts (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999; Talesh 2009, 2012), these responses
781are becoming institutionalized and gaining legitimacy. In particular, public legal
782institutions are deferring to and encouraging organizations to purchase cyber secu-
783rity insurance.
784The Department of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs
785Directorate recently convened working sessions and roundtables with the insurance
786industry to discuss ways to make public and private institutions more cyber secure.
787While acknowledging that the cyber insurance market is relatively nascent as com-
788pared to other lines of insurance, the Department of Homeland Security’s report
789concluded that cyber insurance is vital: “A robust cybersecurity insurance market
790could help reduce the number of successful cyberattacks by: (1) promoting the
791adoption of preventative measures in return for more coverage; and (2) encouraging
792the implementation of best practices by basing premiums on an insured’s level of
793self-protection” (Penensky, Traub, and Leff 2015). Moreover, the report devoted
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794extensive attention toward improving risk management within organizations, the
795very kinds of services cyber insurance companies are offering (Department of
796Homeland Security 2014). Thus, it appears that insurance institutions are shaping
797the content and meaning of cyber security compliance.
798Moving forward, this article suggests that there is great potential for construc-
799tive linkages between studies on risk management and law and organizations. More
800research on how risk-based logics are mobilized by intermediaries and mediate the
801way organizations deal with cyber security threats and comply with privacy laws
802would help strengthen organizational theory and reveal how, in action, the meaning
803of compliance is often constructed by legal intermediaries.
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